White Collar Crimes - Normalization of Deviance

Normalization of Deviance 2

Abstract

The normalization of deviance involves three factors. First, there is an information context that makes it difficult to separate out important messages and signals from those that can be safely ignored. This problem may arise because the information itself is ambiguous or because there is simply too much of it for people to assimilate and evaluate effectively. Second, structural secrecy hinders the flow of information to decision makers and throughout the organization. Because of the division of labor among subunits and because of task specialization, people in one part of an organization may not really understand the significance of what people in another part are doing. Third, the organization is subject to environmentally generated pressures or expectations to achieve some goal. For business corporations the pressure comes mainly from the market and the need to make a profit. For other types of organizations, such as NASA, the expectations may be political in nature, but organizations are always under some type of pressure to perform (Gross, 1978).

The concept of the Normalization of Deviance lies within normal deviance; which is deviant behavior that is not recognized as actors being deviant. Offenders must use techniques of neutralization to protect their sense of identity implies that they are aware that their behavior could be construed as illegal or morally objectionable. Neutralizations imply intentionality. Potential offenders are seen as convincing themselves that no one will really be hurt, or it's not really my fault, or the law is unfair to begin with, or it's more important to save the company and the workers' jobs than to obey the law (Benson and Simpson, 2009).

Some white-collar crime scholars argue that large organizations are characterized by situations in which deviance can become normalized. In making decisions about what to do in a risky situation, the individuals involved reinterpret information that was originally seen as a sign of potential danger so that it is viewed as acceptable and non-deviant. This reinterpretation of evidence leads to a decision that has unintended but very harmful outcomes and that retrospect looks very foolish if not criminally negligent on the part of the decision makers (Vaughn, 2005).

An example of normalizing deviance is best explained using the Space Shuttle Challenger tragedy. In 1986, the Challenger exploded after the launch which unfortunately killed all of the astronauts. Afterwards, an investigation proved that NASA was warned about a serious failure on the shuttle. They went forward with the launch because of a lot of political pressure to keep a deadline. Ignoring the warnings were deliberate which violated safety rules and people lost their lives.

Vaughn argues that the decision