Free Will Vs Determinism: Is Compatibilism a Third Way?

Do we have free will? Whilst there may be some evidence that we are free agents, and, in fact,  I have, for instance, therefore, freely chosen to complete this essay instead of watching the Champions League semifinal, in many occasions we can repeat with St. Paul, when offered that extra pint in the pub, even when we positively know that we will regret it next morning:  “…for though the will to do what is good is in me, the power to do it is not: the good thing I want to do, I never do; the evil thing which I do not want- that is what I do”^[1]

The fact that there has been a long debate amongst philosophers and there is still to be found a fully satisfactory answer to the problem of free will, leads us to think that one of the problems is that both sides of the argument may mean different things when they talk about free will, in the same way the concept of life tends to differ in an argument over abortion between a pro-choice and a pro-life person.

There are many ways in which one can deal with the problem of free will, and when you realize the importance consequences and implications that can be derived from it (religious, ethical, scientific, …), you came to realize why there is such a heated debate.

If we have free will, it means that God does not interfere in our actions, that we are morally responsible for our acts and that “human will (is) an exception to the principle of universal causality”^[2] If, on the other hand, we follow the views of Democritus’ master and mentor, Leucippus, and affirm that “"Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity - οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης”^[3], we do not leave space for personal freedom and consequent moral responsibility for one’s acts.

We can see how the problem of free will can be traced back as early as the Ancient Greeks and, as we have illustrated with the previous example, how since its beginning has been tied to the problem of the moral responsibility for one’s actions and has also been closely related to both the problem of determinism and the problem of causality.  Kasimierz Ajdukiewicz, in his Problems and Theories of Philosophy, outlines the issue magnificently:

“…On this interpretation the question whether the human will is free is reduced to the question whether the acts of the human will are unequivocally determined by certain causes or not…whether a man equipped with a certain character, dispositions and predilections, must, as a result of certain motives, make specific decisions or whether a man of a given character can, as a result of given motives, decide one way or the other.”^[4]

In other words, he continues, “the problem of the freedom of the will is concerned with the question whether the human will is subordinated to the general principle of causality or whether it escapes from its constraints”^[5]

At the core of the discussion then, there is the question of whether the events are determined or not (determinism Vs indeterminism) and whether freedom can coexist with determinism (compatibilism) or not.

There are a few types of determinism. Casual determinism says that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Logical determinism is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. Theological determinism is the thesis that there is a God who determines all that humans will do. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free, if there is a being who has determined them for us ahead of time. Biological determinism is the idea that all behavior, belief, and desire are fixed by our genetic endowment.

Incompatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are logically incompatible categories. This could include believing that determinism is reality, therefore free will is an illusion (hard determinism), or that free will is true, therefore determinism is not (libertarianism), or even that neither determinism nor free will is true (pessimistic Incompatibilism). The essence of Incompatibilism is that free will can never exist because everything is already pre-determined. They strongly hold the opinion that morality and determinism cannot be compatible because no one will be responsible for something that have been determined before everything happens.

Compatibilism was led by the ancient Greek Stoics, Hobbes, Hume and many contemporary philosophers and is a theory that argues that free will and determinism can exist together because they are compatible.

To focus our discussion on the realm of science, we will try to outline and illustrate the problem of free will as understood by a hard determinist such as Sam Harris and will contrast it with the vision of a compatibilist like Daniel Dennett, before developing our own personal opinion on the matter.

Although we could have considered also other compatibilist approaches such as Edith Stein’s, Dennett’s position seems to engage more and better with Sam Harris, since he also explored the latest neurological developments.

 It is difficult to disregard the data provided by recent discoveries on neuroscience and genetics that may suggest that our actions are very much determined by our genetic inheritance and by our actions and circumstances in the past.

In that respect, I read with interest an article at Popular Science, by Lois Parshley, in which a person was spared the life sentence after admitting killing his wife on the grounds that “his genes made him do it”.^[6] 

In that particular instance, they found in the killer a genetic variant on his X chromosome, one that coded the enzyme monoamine oxidase-A (MAOA), which is in charge of breaking down crucial neurotransmitters, such as dopamine and serotonin, which, if left unchecked, can build up in the brain and cause a loss of impulse control and an increase in violence and rage.

This would have been used by Professor Harris in his recent work Free Will to defend that “free will is an illusion” and we are merely “biochemical puppets”. We really do not have a free choice, according to Harris.