The Virtuous Act of the Non-Virtuous Agent

I do not personally believe that one must be virtuous to perform a virtuous act. Does a person who commits a robbery at gunpoint perform an act of virtue if they do not pull the trigger, sparing the victims life? Could the person committing the robbery be considered a virtuous person? Though the act of sparing a life can be considered a virtuous act, I would hardly go as far as calling the perpetrator in this case virtuous, or good, or just.

According to Aristotle one becomes virtuous only after having repeatedly performed acts of virtue. While Aristotle makes no claim that virtue is a trait one is born with, he does however insist upon the fact that virtue is learned. Aristotle states that "It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good" (as cited in Cahn, 2011, p. 117). According to Aristotle, when put into normal practice, virtue can be achieved.

Courage can take on many faces. One need not meet the ideal of what is considered by its definition, to commit a courageous act. In fact, one could be a coward, and commit an extreme act of courage. When one thinks of courage, a thought of the hero off to war, or the brave policeman or fireman immediately comes to mind. A person can be none of these, or not even close. If this person is a coward in every sense, but is called upon to donate a kidney in order to save another person's life, is this individual not then performing a courageous act? I would say that the act itself is courageous, but the person is not necessarily virtuous.

One cannot be pigeon holed into an ideal that all in an approach regarding virtue or a virtuous act is absolute. Liezl Van Zyl writes that "According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if, and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances" (Van Zyl, 2011). This cannot hold true on all accounts, or in all circumstances. Variables, such as those mentioned in the robbery and kidney donor scenario detailed above, contradict the notion that the act must be a common practice, performed by the agent, for the act to be truly virtuous. Thomas Hurka writes "the dispositional view which requires that we be able to identify virtuous character traits and persons independently of virtuous acts or feelings; otherwise its account of the latter will be circular" (Hurka, 2006). An act, if the intent is good, can be virtuous despite the practice or continued performance of said act by the agent.

Reference

Cahn, S. M. (Ed). (2011). Morality and Moral Philosophy: Exploring ethics: An Introductory