Socrates Case

In the dialogue Euthyphro Socrates asks Euthyphro. "What is the pious, and what the impious (5d)?" Euthyphro suddenly gives an answer that pious is what he himself is doing now. Impious would be not to prosecute his own father for murder (5d-e). Socrates is not satisfied by Euthyphro's answer. Socrates understands that prosecuting his own father maybe an example of what is pious, but there are many pious actions. Socrates was looking for the definition for what all pious actions are (6d-e). I agree with Socrates that examples make it difficult to truly understand a word. For example, if I were to say this is an "A" paper to the five GSI's at the same time, there is a great chance that they will all interpret my claim differently. Charles might think an "A" paper is merely four 8.5 X 11 inches of paper stapled together. Josh may believe a bunch of small black words written on a blank white page is considered an "A" paper. I cannot control the thoughts of other people, but I can make my definition more clear. That is exactly what Socrates is trying to do by guiding Euthyphro and questioning his answers. Socrates then rephrases his question asking what "makes all pious actions pious" (6d-e)? Euthyphro answered by saying that "what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious (7a)." Socrates breaks apart Euthyphro's answer step by step. First he establishes that men disagree about things such as large and small, heavy and light, beautiful and ugly and so on (7b-e). He then goes on to ask if the gods were to have differences wouldn't they be about the same subjects (7e)? Euthyphro agrees with Socrates (7e) not realizing where Socrates is headed. Euthyphro has already violated one of the conditions that a solid definition consists of. The word "dear" is an evaluation rather then a description. Something that is "dear" is loved and all the gods don't love the same things. The dialogue continues as Socrates says, so if different gods like different things another god can hate what one god loves (8a). So one thing would be pious and impious at the same time (8a). So Socrates' question was not answered, because he didn't want to know "what same thing is both pious and impious" (8a-b). The mistake that Euthyphro made with this definition is that the definition of pious doesn't hold true for all things that are pious, but also true for those things that are impious. It is difficult for a person to know what the gods love. I don't think we as humans have an absolutely certain answer for what the gods love, therefore cannot use this definition for pious and impious. Then again there is the question of which gods Euthyphro is referring to. Is he only referring to the gods believed by those from the city of Athens? These are things that we do not know precisely. Socrates and Euthyphro went on to look for a definition of pious and impious, yet hit many roadblocks. The dialogue Euthyphro ends in an aporia, with no answer to what is pious and impious. Even though we do not learn what the definition of pious and impious is, we are able to identify three conditions that satisfy a definition according to Socrates.

In the dialogue Meno Socrates is having a discussion with Meno about virtue. Socrates asks Meno what he thinks virtue is (74d)? Meno says, " there is a virtue for every action and every age, for every task of ours and ever one of us (72a)." As I see it Meno is claiming that virtue is subjective rather than objective. Meno's statement indicates that he believes every person has their own virtue depending on their social status, so it is not the same for all. Socrates subtly tries to help Meno realize that his claim has a few holes in it. Meno doesn't give a definition of virtue that holds true for all things that are virtue, therefore doesn't satisfy one of the conditions for a solid definition. Socrates asks Meno if he thinks, "bees differ from one another in so far as they are bees" (72b)? Or only in the sense of their beauty, size or some other ways (72b)? Meno