Skepticism Essay

According to Kurtz, skepticism evaluates claims based on reason and treatment of evidence. He implicitly suggests that the skeptic needs to confirm that evidence is empirical, of observation or experience, before logically justifying larger arguments, thereby aiming to produce more objectively true knowledge by avoiding biased analysis of evidence. However, that aim creates an issue in the extent to which skepticism can use reason alone to interpret empirical evidence. The skeptic Michael Shermer defines skepticism as a method of testing a claim “by calling for evidence to prove or disprove it….and exploring  the motives and biases that go into data collection and interpretation” (Shermer 41, 42). Implicitly, Shermer’s skepticism aims to reduce an individual’s possible biases when relying on emotion and sense perception. Skepticism therefore challenges claims by challenging the individual biases in analyzing evidence.  However if we compare reason in mathematics versus human sciences, the standards by which skepticism challenges knowledge in mathematics versus knowledge in human sciences may differ to some extent. To evaluate skepticism, I will compare the application of skepticism in mathematics and ethics, identifying the weaknesses and strengths of applying skepticism to claims in those AOKs. Specifically, I will evaluate inductive claims, in which evidence collectively leads to a general claim with a reasonably scope. Furthermore, I will examine how the skepticism evaluates claims differently using reason compared to using language to decide if skepticism is purely theoretical or has social and pragmatic applications. We will conclude that the skeptic challenges the empiricism of evidence and the extent to which analysis uses reason.

The extent to which skeptics use empirical evidence can limit the accuracy of inductive claims when using reason. Described in Edward Dolnick’s The Clockwork Universe, Johannes Kepler’s final model of planetary orbit is more a construct than inductive theory. Shermer makes a clear distinction between theory and construct; while a theory is a claim supported and supportable by experimental tests, a construct is a claim that cannot be tested (45). Kepler tracks Jupiter’s and Saturn’s orbits using written and visual models, but he does not “compare the actual sizes of the planets’ orbits with the sizes his model predicts” (Dolnick 149-151). Subsequently, Kepler relies primarily on geometric reason rather than empirical observations.  His final model becomes a subjective construct based on Kepler’s ideal reasoning without empirical data. Personally, I consider Kepler’s error akin to solving a calculus problem with multiple parts with the last answer dependent on calculations within previous sections. If early calculations are wrong, the next answers must be wrong even if I use a consistently logical method. However, it’s possible that my final answer is correct without the use of logical calculations. While I can easily fix my calculations to match the correct answer, Kepler cannot test his construct and support it with empirical data. Though Kepler’s theory can only reflect the available experimental tools present in his time, Shermer’s skepticism would tolerate the inaccuracy but disagree with the extent to which Kepler adhered to constructs of reason rather than observations. Although Kepler begins his theory with carefully constructed models, his subjective bias comes from the inability to verify the model with tests. As Kepler continues to use a hypothetical construct rather than observational data, he realizes his construct contradicts existing planetary data. In mathematics therefore, skepticism uses only reason to challenge the extent to which empirical evidence can and does justify inductive claims.

While skepticism can challenge the method of data interpretation in mathematics, the use of total reason is hindered by biological factors when analyzing communicated evidence. According to cognitive scientist Steven Pinker, some anthropologists have found “aptitudes and tastes that all cultures have in common” (Pinker 632-633). Despite the role of culture in learning capability, Pinker further claims that tests done on twins’ brains show that the difference “in gray matter in the prefrontal lobe is genetic and correlates significantly with differences in intelligence” (635). Pinker implies that primarily culture and environment develop skills of communication and learning, yet common evolutionary origins underlie all cultures. As those cultures diverge, genes change and account for individual differences in reasoning capabilities. Since biological differences influence reasoning and interpretation of language, skepticism cannot objectively communicate and evaluate linguistic evidence. Factoring ethnic origins into learning language, would reason alone allow me to understand Spanish as well as a native speaker? Pinker’s “blank-slate” theory would argue that genetics cannot determine learned responses to one’s environment; the skeptic would consider factors like the understanding of each new word, the difference in experience between the speakers, and each speaker’s capability to hear. In Shermer’s view, however, that “flaw in pure skepticism” would hinder skeptics from reaching pragmatic understanding (16). Likewise, Shermer’s critique of definitions suggests semantic issues, in which skeptics might argue that minor imprecision of language brings bias into data interpretation. Even when referring to empirical evidence, skeptics might argue that the differences in how each individual processes and communicates information become linguistic biases. Like inductive claims of mathematics, inductive claims of language are similarly susceptible to biased interpretation of evidence. However, biological biases weaken skepticism’s reason and practicality in linguistic claims, while skeptics can maintain reason in mathematical claims by adhering to data. The subjectivity in interpreting communicated evidence encourages skepticism by encouraging individual inquiry, yet the standard for “evidence” remains subjective in both WOKs, especially in ethics.