Right to Die? Terminally Ill and Their Rights Under Article 2

Right to die? Terminally ill and their rights under Article 2.

Article 2 of the European Human Right convention protects the most essential and fundamental right of all – a right to life. The right to life is one of the most important human rights as it is the most basic one. The other rights are based on the fact that one lives. Without the right to life, all other rights and laws become illusory.^[1] Nevertheless the European Court of Human Rights have been required to rule on highly sensitive ethical and medical cases, where terminally ill applicants wish to obtain their rights to die, or on contrary right to live.

The aim of this paper is to assess whether there is a common stance of the Court when ruling on cases relating to right of terminally ill persons.

The first and second paragraph briefly summarises the main conclusion of the court rulings on cases Pretty v. UK and Lambert and Others v. France while the third paragraph analyses the principles that are in common in these ruling and elaborates the possible reasons for the existane of particular stance of the court.

One of the first and most analysed ECHR cases on end of life is Pretty v. The United Kingdom, where the applicant, at the final stage of terminal disease appealed against UK decision not to permit her husband to lawfully assist in her suicide, as she was physically incapable of acting on her own.^[2] The Court held that in the given circumstances of the case, the Article 2 has not been violated by the United Kingdom, ruling that: the right to life can not be interpreted as conferring the opposite right- a right to die.^[3] Furthermore the Court carefully stressed out that this ruling did not mean that if a particular State does recognise a right to die that it would be contrary to Article 2; nor did it mean that if a State that did recognise a right to die were to be held to have acted in accordance with Article 2.^[4]

        In another, more recent case Lambert and Others v France ^[5] the applicant’s aim was in fact- the contrary as that of Pretty vs. UK. The Lambert family argued that their tetraplegics son’s rights to life would be violated if the State declares lawful the decision of the doctor to withdraw artificial hydration and nutrition.

Interestingly, despite the contrasting concerns of the applicants in the Lambert case and that of Pretty, the ECHR once again ruled that there would be no violation of Article 2 in the event of implementation of Frances judgement on legality of withdrawal of substance vital for sustaining life. Furthermore The Court reiterated that it was primarily for the domestic authorities to verify whether the decision of treatment withdrawal is compatible with domestic legislation. Moreover- the court observed that in the sphere which concerned the end of life, states must be afforded a margin of appreciation.