Jack Smart Case

Jack Smart presents two arguments in association to the identity theory. The first argument is in relation to ontological parsimony, in which Smart describes this in association with Ockham's razor principle. This argument describes that when opposing theories both have understandable explanations, the one that is the simplest should be chosen, as it will represent the one that will consider the least number of assumptions. Whilst Ockham's razor principles, states not to multiply entities beyond what is necessary. Therefore the argument describes the idea to consider the theory with the least number of entities, as this will ultimately be the theory that assumes the least number of assumptions. In comparison of the identity theory and dualism both the theories acknowledge the existence of neural goings-on and brains, however the identity theory can be identified as more parsimous compared to dualism, as dualism only considers one kind of elemental unit. The second argument, presented by Smart is in regards to nomological danglers. 'Nomological danglers,' an expression from Freigl, is described as sensations that are not explained roughly through scientific knowledge in physics and biology. The argument describes the presence of mental-physical correlations, taken as brute facts, which are facts that do not require an explanation, that result when there is no correlation between mental and physical entities. This is because it has been deemed impossible to obtain a correlation law from mental experiences and physical activity. Therefore the presence of the brute facts leads to the existence of nomological danglers. The nomological danglers are believed to dangle from basic laws stemming from physics and chemistry, which ultimately connect sensations with neurons. However if mental and physical entities are identified with each other, it eliminates the presence of mental physical correlations and nomological danglers. The identity theory according to Smart is therefore that identity is a combination science, in various fields that work to explain occurrences in daily lives.

Kripke states that identities are required, in the case of genuine identity statements. He also states that he also believes in the existence of "science discoveries of identities." The main argument that Kripke presents is in relation to C-fibres. He argues that if C-fibres could exist without pain, then it would result in the notion that for there not to be pain, no pain may exist. This presents a contradiction to the identity of pain and its physical state. Thus a correlation between the mental and physical entities of pain do not exist, and as pain is a sensation that is felt and identified by an individual, Kripke notions that identity of pain is false, thus it is not true at all. This presents a problem for identity theorists as if pain is equivalent to C-fibres, and no pain is felt from the C-fibres, it would have to be assumed