Is It Justified to Kill an Innocent Threat in Defence

Is it justified to kill an innocent threat in defence of one self or others? Why/why not?

An ‘Innocent Threat’ is a person who poses an imminent threat to your life, but is not the originating cause of that threat. I will divide this essay in regards to the essay question with a section focusing on killing an innocent threat in defence of one self and another section highlighting the permissibility of killing an innocent threat in defence of others. The ideas to aid the permissibility of killing an innocent threat in defence of one self are the traditional restrictions on self-defence, using the case presented by Thomson (1991): The Falling Fat Man. On the contrary, I will mention Otsuka (1994) as a point of comparison and outline the implication with his view. Similarly, the ideas to support the permissibility of killing an innocent threat in defence of others specifically, is the preference utilitarians.

Traditional restrictions of self-defence where there must be conditions to be met for self-defence to be justified. First of all, the threat must be imminent. Secondly, the defensive violence must be necessary. Thirdly, the force used in defence must be somehow proportionate to the threat (Study guide, page 34). In relation to the Innocent Threat, the criteria met are that the threat is imminent and defensive violence is necessary.  However, these criteria are not sufficient, and thus require additional approaches. I will be discussing these additional approaches in order for killing in self-defence to be justified.

An example of an Innocent Threat is presented by Thomson (1991) where a falling fat man will land on you and consequently, kill you. However, this can be avoided through shifting an awning, resulting in the death of the fat man. Thomson (1991) believes it is justified to act in self-defence in order to save yourself because the fat man is posed to being a threat in your life. In contrast, Otsuka (1994) believes in the impermissibility to act in self-defence in Innocent Threat due to the fact that the fat man is not the responsible cause.  Furthermore, I intend to argue that killing an innocent threat in defence of oneself or others is justifiable through the use of different ideas compared to Philosophers’ work such as Thomson (1991).

Thomson (1991) presents cases in which it is morally permissible to kill a person in self-defence and cases in which she thinks it is not permissible. In particular, Thomson (1991) believes here are no moral differences between the cases where it is morally permissible to kill a person in self-defence. I will now discuss the cases in which Thomson (1991) argues the permissibility to kill a person in self-defence.
A Villainous Aggressor has the intention to kill you. The case presented by Thomson (1991)  is the case of a truck driver deliberately trying to run you over. In comparison, an Innocent Aggressor has another cause for his aggression.

Thomson (1991) believes it is morally permissible to kill an innocent threat in self-defence. An Innocent Threat has no intentions to kill you, but is still able to do so unless you can kill him or her.

The reason why Thomson (1991) believes there is no moral difference between these cases is because she believes, person has a right against another that they not kill that person. If these rights are violated that they not kill, then they don’t have the rights that you don’t kill them (Thomson 1991:300).

With that being said, Thomson (1991) believes that it is not morally permissible to kill a bystander as they do not have a causal involvement in the imminent threat to your life. A person that has a causal involvement is person who is responsible for making the victim threatened. Whether it is permissible for me to kill the fat man in self-defence is dependent on whether it is true that if the fat man is causally involved in me being at risk of death then, if the threat to me is not stopped, the fat man will have killed me as it is violating his rights not to be killed. It was concluded by Thomson (1991) that bystanders do not violate your rights of not being killed, and in turn, you must not violate theirs. Hence, in addition to the traditional restrictions of self-defence, Thomson believes causal responsibility is also required in order to fulfil the justifiability of killing in self-defence in addition of the traditional restrictions.