Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Attack on Pearl Harbor and His Plan to Keep Dewey Quiet

Angela Mitchell

HIEU 355-001

Dr. Saxon

11 April 2011

Franklin D. Roosevelt:

The Attack on Pearl Harbor

and

His Plan to Keep Dewey Quiet

Recently, political history has become popular among many modern historians. The amount of historical information collected through political elections as well as the art of campaigning is still becoming a major interest of study. The election of 1944 shaped the initial reconstruction at the end of the Second World War. Officially, bringing the United States into the war, the attack on Pearl Harbor caused a major controversy facing the presidential campaign debates around and even after this time. Presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey, governor from New York ran against the undefeated Franklin Roosevelt in the election campaign of 1944. During the election, many issues served as the basis for debate between the two. Although Roosevelt won, Thomas Dewey had suspected that Roosevelt had known about the attack on Pearl Harbor, yet he never used it against him. The presidential campaign of 1944 had the capability of rendering a completely different outcome had presidential candidate Thomas Dewey exposed Roosevelt. Many believe that Roosevelt did not have prior knowledge about the attack on Pearl Harbor; however, some such as Dewey believe that he did. Roosevelt placed an oil embargo on Japan, in cutting off Japan's oil supply; Roosevelt knew that Japan would only have enough oil to sustain them for six months, and Roosevelt had previously known about Purple codes and the fact that the military had cracked the Japanese codes as well.

Even before the United States entered World War II after Pearl Harbor, Japan and the U.S did not see eye to eye. Japan previously received over eighty percent of their oil from the United States. Because of the fact that the nation of Japan depended so heavily on imports, Roosevelt, with the help of the military decided that cutting off the oil, being imported would freeze the country, leaving Japan with the option of either relying on another commercial source, or resulting to war with the U.S. Signed, on September 27, 1941, the tripartite pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy leading Roosevelt to believe that along with the alliance, and America's support for Great Britain an embargo would eventually lead the U.S into war. Roosevelt knew long before the attack in December, that war with Japan would be an option. If Japan would not be willing to negotiate with the U.S in regards to pulling out of Indochina and initiating a full retreat, then their main option would be to fight.

Because the Japanese-American commercial treaty, signed in 1911 would expire on January 26, 1940, it made possible Roosevelt's decision to place an embargo on Japanese goods. As a result, Roosevelt terminated the 1911 treaty, allowing him to impose "tariffs, quotas, and embargoes" on Japan at any given time. While Roosevelt submitted his negotiation with Japan, he also knew that Japan only had enough oil to sustain their military for six months. On a plan like that, Roosevelt had to have known that Japan would strike back in defense once they ran out. During those six months, Japan considered negotiations with the U.S while secretly building and preparing their military for war.

Many historians recognize the term Purple (the Japanese machine used to encrypt secret messages) when talking about almost any and every subject relating to World War II, Pearl Harbor, and Roosevelt's presidency. Roosevelt received intercepts by Magic (the U.S machine used to encrypt deciphered messages from other countries) on a regular basis at the white house. On December 6, 1941, Roosevelt anxiously awaited a Japanese message that would detail whether or not they accepted or declined U.S negotiations. The thirteenth part clearly rejected the American negotiation offer, and the fourteenth part would not arrive until the next morning around 10 a.m. However, Historian David Kahn believes that Roosevelt knew of the Japanese intentions for war before he even finished reading the thirteenth message. In his article, Kahn mentions that Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's only confidant commented on how "it