Descartes Case

Although the Second Meditations seem to suggest Descartes' position is that we can know of existence before essence, a closer look at the Objections and Replies would result in a clarification-he believes existence cannot be known without essence. Rather, they go hand-in-hand--knowledge of one cannot be without the other. This is due to the nature of the Cogito as a perfomative and not an inference. An analysis of Descartes' accounts will show this--and how the seeming incompatibility is due to misconceptions by critics.

According to the text of the Meditations, Descartes states that in the Deceiver hypothesis that "he will never bring it about that I am nothing as long as I think that I am something." But he does not state explicitly what this "something" is, and it is referred to as a "thing" throughout most of the course of the Meditations. He states how there is something that thinks, ergo exists--without stating what "thing" it is. He has stated an attribute, which does not necessarily constitute essence. There should be a clear distinction made between a subject's faculties and acts, that Descartes has not made. To think is an act the subject engages in, and not necessarily its essence. The word "think" can be replaced by "walk", but it would seem odd to say that the essence lies in an ability to walk. There seems to be no mention of nature, only properties.

This makes Descartes' account seem as though it is only able to deal with the issue of existence, failing to explain essence. Based on the above interpretation, the conclusion states that the thinking thing must exist, but there is no need for a mention of essence. It could be changed just as easily to "I walk therefore I am," and the conclusion remains the same. It implies that Descartes' thinks we can know of existence without knowledge of essence. This seems to be substantiated by textual evidence when he states, "But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? (remember, I am not admitting that there is anything else in me except a mind)" after he describes the "thing" as "merely something extended, changeable and flexible." The description is far too vague to provide knowledge of its nature; once again, an attribute is stated.

But this account is problematic, because of its incompatibility with Descartes' Replies to Objections made. In his Replies, he says, "one thing cannot be demonstrated without the other," indicating that existence cannot be shown without knowledge of essence. Also, he defines his own account of essence, stating "I have never thought that anything more is required to reveal a substance than its various attributes," that we understand the nature of something more by knowing more attributes. According to his account, essence (or nature, in his terms) is understood through qualities. This is in response to the Fifth Objections, which asked him to state the inner substance whose