Construction Case

AIM

1. The aim of this paper is to explain the delay in the CSB construction program from three to five years.

BACKGROUND

2. UNMISS initially planned to construct a total of 35 County Support Bases (CSBs) in conflict prone areas to support the local governments and communities in South Sudan. Construction was to occur over a three year period with nineteen CSBs planned for constructed in 2011-12, nine CSBs in 2012-13 and a further seven CSBs in 2013-14. The SRSG approved the first nineteen CSB sites on 18 October 2011 and recces were conducted from November 2011 to January 2012 to select the sites. This activity was followed by land/facility negotiations with local officials and the completion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between UNMISS and the appropriate local authority.

PLANNING PROCESS

3. Mission Support commenced the planning for the construction of the 35 CSBs prior to Mission start-up in May 2011 with a comprehensive review of engineering assets and the engineering configuration that was required to support the Mission concept. The Mission examined the items that could be made available from liquidated assets from UNMIS, UNAMID as well as neighbouring Missions and SDS stock. The mission's request for SDS release was not approved by DFS and the mission was directed to take surplus assets from UNAMID. The military engineering company configuration was based upon having four separate Horizontal Military Engineering Companies (HMECs) to do the CSB ground works, in addition to an organic engineering company deploying with each of the five infantry battalions to build the Company Operating Bases (COBs). This configuration was communicated to DFS in June 2011.

4. The first 19 CSB sites were approved by the SRSG on 18 October 2011. The construction plan could not be finalized until the recces were completed in December 2011 as detailed planning required knowledge of the unique elements of each site. The plan had to incorporate ground conditions, accessibility by road and air, availability of commercial suppliers, local labour and materials as aggregate and cement which significantly influence the construction requirements and timelines. Materials and equipment could not be shipped to the sites and construction could not be commenced until the land was acquired through a formal MOU. Normally it took two months to obtain a signed MOU but in some cases it took six to eight months to complete the MOU negotiations.

5. Twelve sites were in use by January 2012, six of which were planned to be replaced with greenfield sites as part of the 2011-12 construction plan (Akobo, Pibor, Pariang, Yirol, Turalei, and Mayom). Four locations were previous UNMIS sites that required no engineering work and would not be replaced by greenfield sites. They included Raja, Maridi, Nasser and Melut. Five other sites were rented and also would not be replaced by greenfield sites in 2011-12 but required engineering works of varying degree; Renk (former school rented by the government for CSB offices with UNMISS staff living on the economy), Turalei (rented compound), and Ezo, Nimule , and Kapoeta (UNHCR sites which required renovations and additional living accommodation). As a temporary measure UNMISS used former UNMIS Referendum Support Bases in Pibor, Akobo, and Gok-Machar to provide an UNMISS presence. Each site required extensive work to be inhabitable. It was planned that Pibor and Akobo would be replaced by greenfield sites while Gok-Machar would be expanded using a plot of land next to the existing site.

6. Eleven sites were to be constructed on greenfield sites, Pibor, Pariang, Gok-Machar, Akobo, Turalei, Yirol, Mayom of Boro Medina, Kodok, Koch, and Boma Town. The works in Mayom were stopped in July due to security situation in the area. The CSB sites of Boro Medina, Kodok, Koch, Boma Town were delayed as the sites were not accessible due to the rains. It was later decided to continue to use the existing rented site of Turalei and to delay construction of the greenfield site.

7. Critical to this planning was the availability of funding and materials and engineering capacity. In addition, most sites were not accessible by road during the rainy season and earthworks could not be commenced unless the ground was dry. Another factor which quickly became an issue was the security situation which made areas off-limits to UN personnel. In some cases the Mission was able to use commercial companies to continue the works but the commercial capacity in the country was limited.

BUDGET

8. On start-up the Mission received an allotment from the UNMIS budget of $277.9 million, which took the Mission through to 31 December 2011. An overall budget was presented in October 2011 and full 2011-12 funding was received in January 2012. This budget had to fund the repatriation of troops carried over from UNMIS and the induction of new troops.

9. The 2011-12 budget of $722 million contained $31 million for construction and maintenance of the Mission. For major projects the LPA clearance took more than 7 months and on average LPA clearance was 48 days. For example, for UN House the LPA request was sent to NYHQ on 29 September 2011 but LPA authority was granted in April 2012. This late granting of the LPA did not provide the Mission with sufficient time to complete the procurement process before the closure of the FY resulting in the loss of $14 million engineering funding for the hardwall construction at UN House. As a result, the engineering funding for 2012-13 has been reduced by $14 million.

MATERIAL AVAILABILITY AND MOVEMENT

10. Funding for the construction of the CSBs was built upon the assumption that prefabs liquidated from UNMIS and UNAMID and Italian prefabs purchased from a systems contract would be received in time for construction and that Horizontal Military Engineering Companies (HMEC) would be used to prepare the ground. No funding was available for the rental of heavy equipment, the purchase of additional prefabs, or outsourcing the construction of the sites during 2011-12 fiscal year.

11. Four hundred and twelve containers of prefabs critical for the construction of CSBs and Company Operating Bases (COBs) were part of the liquidated assets from UNMIS and UNAMID arrived in Kosti from 25 July 2010 to 16 January 2011. These containers were held by the Sudanese government in Kosti and after extensive negotiations, the Sudanese government authorized their release in October 2012. However the Sudanese government would not allow the shipment of containers by barge via the Nile and